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Flexible action selection requires knowledge about how alternative actions impact the environment: a “cognitive map” of instrumental
contingencies. Reinforcement learning theories formalize this map as a set of stochastic relationships between actions and states, such
that for any given action considered in a current state, a probability distribution is specified over possible outcome states. Here, we show
that activity in the human inferior parietal lobule correlates with the divergence of such outcome distributions–a measure that reflects
whether discrimination between alternative actions increases the controllability of the future–and, further, that this effect is dissociable
from those of other information theoretic andmotivational variables, such as outcome entropy, action values, and outcome utilities. Our
results suggest that, although ultimately combined with reward estimates to generate action values, outcome probability distributions
associatedwith alternative actionsmay be contrasted independently of valence computations, to narrow the scope of the action selection
problem.
Introduction
Theories of goal-directed behavior originated with a seminal se-
ries of early demonstrations that animals are able to learn about
the structure of their environment in the absence of primary
rewards (Blodgett, 1929; Tolman andHonzik, 1930). Specifically,
in stark contrast to the, then dominating, view of behavior as
being controlled exclusively by the incremental modulation of
stimulus-response (S-R) associations based on contingent re-
ward or punishment (Thorndike, 1933), these studies suggested
that when given the opportunity to explore amaze, nonrewarded
rats constructed a valence-neutral “cognitivemap” of instrumen-
tal and environmental relationships, that could be flexibly inte-
grated with subsequent reward information to generate an
optimal course of action (Tolman, 1948).
Contemporary accounts of behavioral control characterize
instrumental performance as being governed both by the
reinforcement-based, S-R, component and by a more cognitive,
goal-directed, system (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998). These sep-
arate strategies have been formalized as distinct classes of rein-
forcement learning (RL): An automatic “model-free” system, in
which the values of actions are acquired by means of a reward
prediction error (RPE), and a “model-based” class that con-
structs a mental map of the environment and generates decisions
by flexibly combining estimates of state-transition probabilities
with outcome utilities (Doya et al., 2002; Daw et al., 2005). Thus,
in model-based RL, relationships between actions and future
states of theworld are represented explicitly and independently of
associated motivational features.
Notably, given equivalent costs, actions that yield identical
outcome states need not be contrasted further in terms of moti-
vational features, reducing the demand for a computationally
costly binding of outcome probabilities with utilities. Conse-
quently, the extent to which actions differ in terms of their rela-
tionships to future states, that is, the divergence of their outcome
probability distributions, can be used to prune searches of the
mental map. Instrumental divergence also serves as a measure of
agency–the more actions differ with respect to contingent states,
the more flexible control an agent has over its environment. Be-
cause of these important characteristics, we hypothesized that a
neural signature of instrumental divergence, dissociable from
that of motivational variables, would be discernible during hu-
man goal-directed performance.
We scanned human participants with functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) as they performed a simple task in
which available actions yielded various food rewards with differ-
ent probabilities (Fig. 1A). Our primary objective was to assess
neural correlates of the difference between outcome distributions
associated with alternative actions, formalized as Jensen–Shan-
non (JS) divergence–a measure that quantifies the distance be-
tween probability distributions. The relationship between JS
divergence and other decision variables is illustrated in Figure 1B.
First, in this example, uncertainty about which outcome will be
obtained (i.e., outcome entropy) is the same across actions; for
each action, one can be almost certain that a particular food
reward will occur while the alternative food and the “no food”
outcome will not. Likewise, provided that one enjoys oranges as
much as Twix bars, the actions are equivalent in terms of their
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expected value. And yet, the two actions
clearly differ with respect to contingent
states; this difference is captured by JS
divergence.
Materials andMethods
Participants. Twenty-two healthy normal vol-
unteers (mean age  23 0.1  4.3; range 
19–38, 10 females) participated in the study.
The volunteers were pre-assessed to exclude
those with a history of neurological or psychi-
atric illness. The eating attitudes test (EAT-26)
(Garner et al., 1982) was administered and in-
dicated no eating disorders in any of the sub-
jects (mean score, 3.6  2.8; range, 0–13; all
scores were under the 20 point cutoff). Before
being scheduled for the experiment, the sub-
jects were prescreened to ensure that they en-
joyed sweet and salty treats, that they had no
allergies or intolerances, and that they were not
overweight, on a diet, or planning to go on a
diet. Subjects were asked to fast for at least
4 h before their scheduled arrival time at the
laboratory, but were permitted to drink wa-
ter. All subjects gave informed consent and
the study was approved by the Institutional
Review Board of the California Institute of
Technology.
Task and procedure. A simple instrumental
task was used, in which four action alternatives
(i.e., button presses) yielded various food re-
wards with different probabilities. Specifically,
on any given trial, two available actions could
differ with respect to the probability with
which they produced their respective rewards,
with respect to the subjective utility of those
rewards and/or with respect to the integrated
action value. Thus, by manipulating both
probabilities and utilities, we were able to
largely decorrelate the different components of
the decision problem. To ensure sufficient
variance in experienced probabilities and util-
ities, each subject participated in three consec-
utive sessions (during a single appearance by
the subject in the lab), with the same four ac-
tions but with a novel set of food outcomes and outcome probabilities
being used in each session. Throughout the task, available actions were
indicated by corresponding rectangles on the computer screen, together
with images of the food outcomes potentially produced by those actions
(Fig. 1A). At the start of the experiment, participants were informed that
they would have to remain in the laboratory for 30 min after completing
the task, during which they would be allowed to consume any earned
treats.
The probabilities with which actions produced their outcomes were
generated so as to minimize correlations between our three decision
variables (i.e., between outcome probabilities, outcome values, and ac-
tion values), and thus varied slightly across subjects. Nonetheless, across
sessions and action alternatives, probabilities of 0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.7, and 1.0
were used for each subject. In addition, each subject had twoprobabilities
chosen from the set [0.3 0.6 0.8 and 0.9]. The probabilities drawn from
this set differed depending on the decorrelation constraints imposed by
subjective outcome utilities. A minimum of two and maximum of four
distinct probabilities were used in each session.
The subjective values of 36 potential food rewards (listed in Table 1),
represented by photographic images, were assessed using evaluative rat-
ings of their pleasantness (on a scale from 0 to 9), as well as a Becker–
DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) auction procedure that has been shown to
elicit an individual’s willingness to pay for a consumer good (Becker et
al., 1964). The pleasantness ratings were used to set the utility of food
stimuli in subsequent phases of the experiment. The BDM auction was
used to obtain convergent evidence for these ratings, providing a mea-
sure of inter-rater reliability. Specifically, in the BDM auction, partici-
pants were endowedwith $5 with which to bid on the various food items.
They were instructed that, on each trial, they would have to indicate an
amount ofmoney from $0 to $5 that they were willing to pay for the food
item displayed on that trial and that, at the end of the experiment, the
computer would randomly select one trial from all presented in that
Figure 1. Illustration of the task and the concept of outcome divergence.A, Illustration of trial in the choice phase: at the onset
of a trial, two of four alternative actions are highlighted inwhite, indicating their availability, togetherwith depictions of potential
trial outcomes. After participants choose, the chosen action is highlighted in green for 2 s, followed by either a picture of the
obtained food outcome (on rewarded trials) or awhite line in the center of the screen (nonrewarded trials). Trials are separated by
a jittered 6 s intertrial interval. B, An illustration of the relationship between actions, outcomes, and associated probabilities. The
graph shows two available actions, A1 and A2 (coded in blue and red, respectively), where the bars represent the probability
distributionof eachactionacross a set of threepotential outcomes: a Twixbar, anorange, anda “no-food”outcomestate, indicated
by a gray bar. JS divergence is a measure of the distance between the two distributions.
Table 1. List of the 36 food treats used in BDM auction
Kit Kat (small pack) MentosFruit KeeblerChipsDelux
Hershey milk Twix Lays Classic potato chips
Apple (red) Reese’s Lindor Truffles (milk)
Banana Doritos (ranch flavor) Orange
Famous Amos (small pack) Peanut M&Ms Sunmaid raisins
Ferrero Rocher chocolates Fig Newton Rice Krispy Treat (small)
Flaming Cheetos Chips Ahoy (small pack) Oreos
Fritos Skittles Ruffles potato chips
Ghirardelli milk chocolate Lindt Swiss bittersweet dark Streusel Cakes
Godiva dark chocolate bar Milano cookies Toblerone
HoHo Pringle Pepperidge Farms Cookies
Keebler Fudge Stripes cookies Mrs. Fields chocolate chip White grapes
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phase, as well as randomly draw an amount between $0 and $5. Partici-
pants were further told that if the bid that they had indicated on the
randomly drawn trial was less than the amount generated by the com-
puter, they would not receive the food item, but would get to keep the $5,
and that otherwise they would have to pay the amount generated by the
computer and would get to consume the food item.
In each session, participants first went through a “contingency learning”
phase, in which each action was sampled 10 times with associated food
rewards occurring with respective probabilities. Only one action was avail-
able on each trial in this phase, to ensure complete sampling, and outcome
occurrences were generated using predetermined sequences such that if, for
example, the probability of anoutcomewas 0.2, that outcomewaspresented
on exactly 2 of the 10 trials. Furthermore, participants were instructed that
theywouldnot actually earnanyof the foodrewardsproducedby theactions
in this phase, but that it was simply meant to expose them to action–out-
come relationships. They then proceeded to a “choice phase” in which, on
each of 48 trials, they chose between two of the four action alternatives (Fig.
1A). They were instructed that, at the end of the experiment, three trials
wouldbedrawn fromthisphase, and that theywouldbeallowed to consume
any rewards earned on those trials upon completion of the task. Following
the choice phase, participants provided judgments of the existence and
strength of each action–outcome relationship. Active scanning was only
performed during the choice phases.
Computational learning model. We implemented a model-based RL
learner, which uses experience with state transitions to update a matrix,
T(s,a,s), of state transition probabilities, where each element of T(s,a,s)
holds the current estimate of the probability of transitioning from state s
to s given action a. In our task, as illustrated in Figure 1A, on each trial
participants were presented with a choice screen displaying two available
actions together with the food outcomes potentially produced by those
two actions. Thus, each initial statewas defined by the particular available
actions and their potential outcomes. The two available actions were
drawn from a total of four; consequently, in the choice phase of each
session, there were six distinct initial states, repeatedly encountered
across 48 trials. The state transitions were initialized to the prepro-
grammed distributions from the contingency learning phase. In each
step, leaving state s and arriving in state s having taken action a, the
FORWARD learner computes a state prediction error[3] (SPE): SPE 
1 T(s,a,s), and updates the probability T(s,a,s) of the observed tran-
sition via: T (s,a,s)  T(s,a,s)  SPE where  is a free parameter
controlling the learning rate. Estimated transition probabilities are used
together with the rewards at the end states, r(s) (themagnitude of which
were based on pleasantness ratings and taken as given, since potential
rewards were displayed together with the actions) to compute state-
action values, Q(s,a) as the expectation over the value of the successor
state. This is done by defining the state-action values at each level in terms
of reward anticipated at the next level: Q(s,a) s’T(s,a,s) *r(s).
The model additionally assumes that participants select actions sto-
chastically using probabilities generated by a softmax distribution, such
that P(s, a)
exp(  Q(s, a))
b1
n exp(  Q(s, b))
, where the free “inverse tempera-
ture” parameter  controls the degree to which choices are biased toward
the highest valued action. To account for the difference in salience be-
tween food pictures and the “no outcome” display (which simply con-
sisted of a white line), we used separate learning rate parameters,  and
, on rewarded and nonrewarded trials, respectively. Free parameters
were fit to behavioral data by minimizing the negative log-likelihood,
log(P(s,a)), of obtained choices for each individual.
Information theoretic variables.We computed the JS divergence of the
outcome probability distributions for the two actions available on a given
trial. A finite and symmetrized version of the Kullback–Leibler diver-
gence, JS divergence specifies the distance between probability distribu-
tionsM and N as follows:
JSD 
1
2 i ln MiPi  Mi  12 i ln NiPi Ni where P

1
2
M  N.
It is worth noting that, while we have used JS divergence here to quantify
the degree to which alternative actions differ with respect to contingent
transitions in environmental states, it is not the only computational vari-
able that captures this conceptual point. For example, mutual informa-
tion (between actions and outcomes) is a highly related information
theoreticmeasure thatwould be identical to JS divergence for our current
purposes, as would be the  2 divergence. A particularly compelling as-
pect of JS divergence is its remarkable generality: it applies to nominal
and numerical, discrete and continuous random variables, and it intui-
tively generalizes to an arbitrary number of probability distributions. The
applicability to multiple distributions (Lin, 1991) is especially important
as it eliminates the need for a complex, and presumably computationally
costly, process of comparing multiple available actions in a pairwise
fashion.
Another important information theoretic variable that can be ex-
tracted from the state-transition matrix, and that has been previously
shown to profoundly affect decision making (Paulus et al., 2002; Fein-
stein et al., 2006), is the uncertainty, or entropy, of outcome states.
Whereas JS divergence reflects the distance between outcome probability
distributions, entropy reflects the degree of uncertainty in an outcome,
which is greatest when the probability distribution over outcomes is
uniform (i.e., all outcomes are equally likely) and smallest when the
probability of a particular outcome is 1 or 0. We computed the Shannon
entropy of the outcome variable X conditional on the action variable Y,
defined asHXY  
xX, yY
px,ylog
py
px, y
, both for the case where the
(chosen) action is known (p(y) [1,0]) and for the case where the two
available actions are equally likely (p(y)[0.5,0.5]). To illustrate the re-
lationship between outcome probabilities and information theoretic
variables, a representative set of probability distributions, with corre-
sponding levels of JS divergence and entropy, are shown in Figure 2.
Imaging procedure and analysis. A 3 T scanner (MAGNETOM Trio;
Siemens) was used to acquire structural T1-weighted images and T2*-
weighted echoplanar images (repetition time  2.65 s; echo time  30
ms; flip angle  90°; 45 transverse slices; matrix  64 	 64; field of
view  192 mm; thickness  3 mm; slice gap  0 mm) with blood
oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast. To recover signal loss
fromdropout in themedial orbitofrontal cortex (O’Doherty et al., 2002),
each horizontal section was acquired at 30° to the anterior commissure–
posterior commissure axis. Image processing and statistical analyseswere
performed using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first
four volumes of images were discarded to avoid T1 equilibrium effects.
All remaining volumes were corrected for differences in the time of slice
acquisition, realigned to the first volume, spatially normalized to the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) echoplanar imaging template,
and spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (8 mm, full-width at
half-maximum). We used a high-pass filter with a cutoff of 128 s.
For each subject, we constructed an fMRI design matrix, merged
across the three sessions, with two regressors modeling the distinct time
Figure 2. A representative set of cases used in the experiment. Each case consists of two
probability distributions, one for each available action, across three potential outcome states
(O1, O2, and O3) including the no-food outcome. A1 and A2 indicate the two actions available
on a given trial, drawn from a total of four possible action alternatives. X indicates the levels of
JS divergence (blue) and entropy (red) for each case.
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periods of each trial. The first, choice-period regressor, modeled a BOLD
response from the onset of each trial until the chosen action was per-
formed and a second stick function modeled the onset of the feedback
screen. For the choice-period regressor, we entered as parametric mod-
ulators, in order, the expected value of the chosen action, the sum of and
the absolute difference between the expected values of the two available
actions, the utility of the outcome potentially produced by the chosen
action, and the sum and absolute difference in utility of the two potential
outcomes depicted on the screen. Absolute differences, rather than that
between chosen and unchosen, were used to minimize regressor redun-
dancies. Finally, for this trial period, we entered as modulators the en-
tropy conditional on the chosen action, the entropy conditional on both
available actions, and the JS divergence of outcome probability distribu-
tions of available actions. For the outcome regressor, we entered as mod-
ulators, in order, the RPE, the SPE, and the utility of the received
outcome. Orthogonalization was applied according to order such that
each parametric modulator was orthogonalized to all preceding modu-
lators associated with the same onset regressor. To rule out motor-
execution components, the response time on each trial was added as a
regressor of no interest, as were two regressors indicating the three ses-
sions and six regressors accounting for the residual effects of head mo-
tion. All regressors were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic
response function. Group-level random-effects statistics were generated
by entering contrasts of parameter estimates for the differentmodulators
into a between-subjects analysis.
We specifically looked for neural effects in areas previously shown to
be involved in the implementation of our modeled decision variables.
First, in a recent neuroimaging study, Gla¨scher et al. (2010) assessed
neural correlates of SPEs, finding effects in the lateral prefrontal cortex
(LPFC) and intraparietal sulcus (IPS).We predicted that activity in these
areas would likewise correlate with SPEs in the current study. We also
predicted that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) would encode
the entropy of outcome probability distributions: activity in this area has
been shown to scale with the amount of uncertainty associated with a
decision, to predict risk aversion (Weber and Huettel, 2008) and, when
disrupted by transcranial magnetic stimulation, to increase selection of
risky option (Knoch et al., 2006). With respect to our motivational vari-
ables, studies of goal-directed performance, which emphasize the casual
relationships between actions and outcomes (Tanaka et al., 2008; Lilje-
holm et al., 2011) or higher-order relational structures (Hampton et al.,
2006), have implicated the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) in
the encoding of action values. In contrast, activity in the medial orbito-
frontal cortex (mOFC), the insula, and ventral striatum (VS), has been
shown to correlate with the utility, or value, of a stimulus (Hare et al.,
2008; Abler et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2012). The anterior insula has also
been implicated in the affective evaluation of food pictures (Pelchat et al.,
2004; Wang et al., 2004) and in anticipation and experience of appetitive
tastes (O’Doherty et al., 2001, 2002). Finally, The VS has been shown, by
myriad studies, to encode a RPE (O’Doherty et al., 2003, 2004).
Small volume corrections (SVCs) were performed on a priori regions
of interest (ROIs), using a 10 mm sphere with center coordinates ob-
tained by averaging across relevant studies (coordinates are listed in Ta-
ble 2). All other effects were reported at p 
 0.05, using cluster size
thresholding (CST) to adjust for multiple comparisons (Forman et al.,
1995). AlphaSim, a Monte Carlo simulation (AFNI) was used to deter-
mine cluster size and significance. Using an individual voxel probability
threshold of p 0.001 indicated that using aminimumcluster size of 134
MNI transformed voxels resulted in an overall significance of p 
 0.05.
To eliminate nonindependence bias for plots of parameter estimates, a
leave-one-subject-out (Esterman et al., 2010) approach was used, in
which 22 general linearmodels (GLMs)were runwith one subject left out
in each, and with each GLM defining the voxel cluster for the left out
subject. Using rfxplot (Gla¨scher, 2009), mean -weights were extracted
from spheres (10 mm) centered on the LOSO peaks (identified within
ROIs for SVCs) and were averaged across subjects to plot overall effect
sizes.
Results
Behavioral data and model fits
Pleasantness ratings were fairly evenly distributed across the
scale, and were highly correlated (r2  0.99) with bids in the
BDM auction (Fig. 3A). Moreover, participants’ judgments of
action–outcome relationships, collected at the end of each ses-
sion, were close to the programmed contingencies (r2 0.98; Fig.
3B). Finally, a comparison of themodel-derived choice probabil-
ities with participants’ actual choices suggested that the model
matches behavior well (r2 0.98; Fig. 3C).
Neuroimaging results
All results described below are corrected for multiple compari-
sons at p
 0.05 using either CST across the whole brain, or SVC
based on coordinates averaged across previous studies reporting
effects of relevant decision variables (see Materials and Methods
Table 2. Center coordinates for SVC, averaged across local maxima and studies
Area Function
MNI coord.
x, y, z Sources
VMPFC Chosen action value 4, 55,7 Liljeholm et al. (2011)
Tanaka et al., (2008)
Hampton et al. (2006)
mOFC Stimulus utility 0, 29,14 Hare et al. (2008)
Plassmann et al. (2010)
Lateral VS Stimulus utility/RPE 26, 7,6 O’Doherty et al. (2004)
Medial VS 6, 14,2
Insula Stimulus utility L/R anatomical WFU pickatlas
LPFC SPE 45, 11, 32 Gläscher et al. (2009)
IPS SPE 27/39, 54, 42
Right DLPC Entropy 36, 6, 52 Weber et al. (2008)
Figure3. Behavioral results:A, Frequencies of pleasantness ratings for 36 food stimuli across
participants. B, Scatter plot showing the mean bid in the BDM, across participants and food
stimuli, as a function of pleasantness ratings. C, Scatter plot showing the mean rated action
probability, across participants, as a function of programmed action probabilities (binned). D,
Scatter plot showing participants mean choices as a function of the model-generated choice
probabilities (binned). Error bars in indicate SEM.
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for details of multiple-comparison correction strategy). Coordi-
nates and cluster sizes for all the activated areas described below
are reported in Table 3.
State-transition variables
An exploratory test, for areas in which activity during the choice
period (i.e., from the trial onset until a response was performed)
correlated with the distance between the outcome probability
distributions of the two available actions (i.e., with JS divergence)
yielded effects in right anterior supramarginal gyrus of the infe-
rior parietal lobule (IPL; Fig. 4A) as well as in the supplementary
motor area (SMA) extending into the right precentral gyrus, sur-
viving CST correction. Critically, these effects also emergedwhen
no orthogonalization was applied, ruling out the possibility that
activity in these areas was selectively modulated by the orthogo-
nalized component. Neural activity correlating with the entropy
of the chosen action during the same period emerged in the right
DLPFC (SVC) (Fig. 4B). At the time of outcome delivery, activity
in both the LPFC and IPS was significantly modulated by the SPE
(SVC), as was activity extending throughout middle and poste-
rior cingulate cortex(PCC; CST) (Fig. 4C).
Simpler representations of outcome probabilities
A possible alternative explanation for our effects of JS divergence
is that the IPL and SMA are encoding simpler representations of
outcome probabilities; for example, if participants did not attend
to the sensory-specific or potential motivational differences be-
tween food outcomes but instead encoded, for each action, the
probability of obtaining any food reward, activity in the IPL or
SMAmight be scaling with the simple difference between or sum
of these probabilities across available actions. As illustrated in
Figure 1B, JS divergence can deviate quite dramatically from the
difference between reward probabilities, with the former being
relatively high and the latter being zero in this example. Indeed,
the difference between reward probabilities was not strongly cor-
related with JS divergence in our task and, moreover, weak cor-
relations were in different directions across subjects (mean
absolute value of r 0.18, SEM 0.03). Our task also included
several instances for which divergence varied independently of
the sum of reward probabilities; for example, again using Figure
1B, consider a case in which the probabilities associated with the
Twix bar are shifted to the no-food outcome state and vice versa;
this would yield the same level of JS divergence but a dramatic
reduction in the sum of reward probabilities. Nonetheless, the
sum of reward probabilities across available actions was strongly
positively correlated with JS divergence for each subject (mean
r 0.78, SEM 0.05).
To empirically assess the neural effects of simpler representa-
tions of outcome probabilities relative to those of JS divergence
we specified two additional GLMs that were identical to our orig-
inal model except for the replacement of the JS divergence mod-
ulator with a regressor modeling the difference between or the
sum of reward probabilities, respectively, in the second and third
model. Separate models were specified for two main reasons:
first, to avoid excessive colinearity of regressor variables and,
second, to rule out the possibility that neural correlates varied
only with those components of JS divergence that are orthogonal
to linear representations of probabilities. No significant effects of
JS divergence, the difference between, or sum of reward proba-
bilities emerged when a single GLM was used to model all three
variables (in addition to those previously specified) suggesting
that there was indeed too much shared variance between these
regressors.We also found no effects of either the difference or the
sum of reward probabilities at our threshold of statistical signif-
icance when using separate GLMs, although effects did emerge at
an uncorrected threshold of p 
 0.05. To formally determine
which of the three variables provided the best account of neural
activity in the SMA and IPL, we performed a Bayesian model
selection analysis. Specifically, we used the first-level Bayesian
estimation procedure in SPM8 to compute a voxelwise whole-
brain log-model evidence map for every subject and each model
(Penny et al., 2005). Then, to model inference at the group level,
we applied a random effects approach (Rosa et al., 2010) at every
voxel of the log evidence data falling within anatomical masks of
the right supramarginal gyrus and SMA, constructing an ex-
ceedance posterior probability (EPP)map for eachmodel and for
each anatomical area.
We found that the difference between reward probabilities did
indeed provide the best account of neural activity in the largest
Table 3. Coordinates and significance values for imaging contrasts
Contrast Area MNI coord. x, y, z
Cluster size at
p
 0.005
JS Divergence IPL 51,25, 40 398
SMA 9,10, 58
Precentral 54,10, 40
Entropy of chosen action DLPFC 45, 20, 34 68
Summed utility of potential
outcomes
Anterior insula 39, 14, 7 138
Ventral putamen 27, 11,14
Q value of chosen action VMPFC 0, 56,11 33
Dorsal SMA 12,10, 73 536
Paracentral 24,28, 73
RPE Medial frontal cortex 6, 62, 19 1263
VS 9, 11,5 50
Occipital 39,88, 10 3356
SPE PCC 3,31, 31 388
IPS 36,43, 46 198
LPFC 42, 20, 37 108
Figure 4. Imaging effects of state-transition variables. A, Maps of the t statistics for tests of
neuralmodulationby JSdivergence, showingeffects in the right supramarginal gyrus of the IPL.
B,Mapof the t statistics for tests of neuralmodulationby theentropyof theoutcomeprobability
distribution for the chosenaction, showingeffects in theDLPFC.C,Mapof the t statistics for tests
of neural modulation by SPEs during the feedback period of each trial, showing effects in the
LPFC, IPS, and PCC. Bar plot shows responses to SPEs in the LPFC. Bar plots showing mean
-weights across variable values are binned into the 25th, 50th, 75 th, and 100th percentiles.
Error bars indicate SEM. a.u., arbitrary units.
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portion of SMA, generating EPPs 0.33
in 413 voxels, followed by JS divergence
with EPPs 0.33 in 325 voxels. Mean-
while, the sum of reward probabilities
only generated EPPs 0.33 in 14 voxels.
In contrast to the SMA, as shown in Figure
5, JS divergence provided a better account
of neural activity in a dramatically greater
portion of the right IPL than did both the
difference between and sum of reward
probabilities, with EPPs 0.33 in 342
voxels for JS divergence, in 123 voxels for
the difference between probabilities, and
in only 2 voxels for the sum. It is of course
entirely feasible that more than one com-
putation is being performed in a large an-
atomical area, and not necessarily the case that the variable that
shows superiority in the largest number of voxels is the most
essential; in particular when the difference in cluster size is rela-
tively small, and when only one variable generates significant
effects using a classical analysis, as is the case here with JS diver-
gence. Nonetheless, as we cannot completely rule out the differ-
ence between reward probabilities as the source of our effects in
the SMA, we refrain from any further discussion of this area.
Stimulus utility and RPEs
During the choice period, the summed utilities (i.e., pleasantness
ratings) of the two food rewards that could potentially be ob-
tained on a given trial correlated with activity in the left anterior
insula (SVC) and in the left lateral VS (SVC) (Fig. 6A). Weaker
effects also emerged in the right anterior insula and right lateral
VS at p
 0.005 uncorrected. No other effects of stimulus utility
emerged during this trial period. At the time of outcome delivery,
activity in themedial VSwas significantly correlatedwith the RPE
(SVC), as was activity throughout the medial frontal and visual
cortex (CST; Fig. 6B). Notably, there was no effect of the utility of
the delivered outcome; however, this lack of result is likely due to
the high correlation between this variable and the RPE (r 0.7).
To verify that this was the case, we orthogonalized the RPE to
outcome utility, rather than the other way around, giving out-
come utility the explanatory power. Using this model, a test for
the utility of the delivered outcome yielded significant effects in
themOFC (SVC) and throughout the lingual gyrus and calcarine
sulcus (CST).
Action values
The expected value of the chosen action during the choice period
was significantly correlated with activity in VMPFC (SVC) (Fig.
6C), as well as with activity in dorsal SMA, extending throughout
the paracentral lobule and into adjacent frontal and parietal areas
(CST). No effects were found for the sum of, or difference be-
tween, the expected values of available actions.
Discussion
Despite their conceptual appeal and recent popularity, very little
is yet known about howwellmodel-basedRL theories capture the
neural computations underlying goal-directed behavior. In par-
ticular, the formalization of Tolman’s cognitive map as a proba-
bility distribution over instrumental actions and outcomes has
remained largely untested. Here, we found that activity in the
supramarginal gyrus of the IPL correlated with the divergence of
outcome probability distributions associated with available ac-
tions. In contrast, activity in the DLPFC varied with the entropy
of outcome distributions for chosen actions, while activity in the
IPS and LPFC reflected the error-based updating of state transi-
tions. Importantly, these effects were dissociable from those of
motivational variables, such as the utility of potential outcomes,
which elicited activity in the insula and VS, and the expected (Q)
value of the chosen action, which correlated with activity in
VMPFC. Our findings complement recent data suggesting that
animals develop and maintain a rich internal model of their en-
vironment (denOuden et al., 2009; Gla¨scher et al., 2010; Abe and
Lee, 2011).
Although tasks similar to ours have previously been used to
address action–outcome learning, our specific hypothesis–that
outcome divergence may capture how multiple instrumental re-
lationships are simultaneously contrasted in ameaningful way–is
to our knowledge a novel proposal. Our results suggest that the
IPL, an area previously implicated in the planning, execution,
Figure 5. Results of a Bayesian model selection analysis. EPP maps in an anatomical mask of the right supramarginal gyrus,
generated based on three GLMs that were identical except for the inclusion of either JS divergence (left), the difference between
reward probabilities (middle), or the sumof reward probabilities (right). The EPPmaps are thresholded at 0.333with probabilities
of 1.00 indicated by black.
Figure 6. Imaging effects of motivational variables. A, Maps of the t statistics for tests of
neuralmodulation by the summedutility of food outcomes obtainable on a given trial, showing
effects in the anterior insula and lateral VS. Bar plot shows responses in the left anterior insula.
B, Map of the t statistics for tests of neural modulation by RPEs during the feedback period of
each trial, showing effects throughout the medial PFC and in the medial VS. Bar plot shows
responses toRPEs in theVS.C,Mapof the t statistics for tests of neuralmodulationby theQ value
of the chosen action, showing effects in the dorsal SMA andVMPFC. Bar plots show responses in
the VMPFC. Bar plots showingmean-weights across variable values are binned into the 25th,
50th, 75th, and 100th percentiles. Error bars indicate SEM. a.u., arbitrary units.
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and observation of goal-directed actions (Fincham et al., 2002;
Liljeholm et al., 2011, 2012), as well as in the experience of agency
(Chaminade and Decety, 2002; Farrer et al., 2008; Sperduti et al.,
2011), implements a comparison of instrumental probability dis-
tributions. This finding has broad implications, potentially gen-
eralizing to other types of predictive relationships, and providing
a means of linking action–outcome learning to more abstract
features of goal-directed performance, such as agency and intent
attribution.
A closely related topic is how the brain represents various
outcome identities (Hamilton andGrafton, 2006, 2008; Stalnaker
et al., 2010; Abe and Lee, 2011; Klein-Flu¨gge et al., 2013), over
which instrumental divergence can be defined. In a recent neu-
roimaging study, Klein-Flu¨gge et al. (2013) assessed repetition
suppression of BOLD responses to cues that signaled either the
same or different food rewards, essentially yielding a low versus
high level of outcome divergence. They found that the identities
of food outcomes were encoded by the mOFC, with no such
effects emerging in the IPL. Notably, Klein-Flu¨gge et al. (2013)
eliminated any effects of stimuli that predicted neutral events, to
show that mOFC encodes only the identities of rewarding out-
comes. In contrast, the anterior IPL has been shown to exhibit
repetition suppression of BOLD responses to neutral outcome
identities (Hamilton and Grafton, 2006, 2008). Here, we investi-
gate a valence-neutral “cognitive map” of action–outcome con-
tingencies, treating nonreward and rewarding outcome states as
equivalent in our computation of divergence. Although several
other factors differed across Klein-Flu¨gge et al.’s (2013) task and
ours (e.g., our use of probabilistic and instrumental contingen-
cies), we suspect that their exclusion of any areas in which the
identities of both neutral and rewarding outcomes were encoded
might account for the differences in neural results.
It should be noted that the IPL has been strongly implicated in
visuospatial attention and salience; however, such effects tend to
emerge in a much more posterior region of the inferior parietal
cortex than that identified here (Mu¨ri et al., 1996; Gottlieb et al.,
1998; Kastner et al., 1999; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Husain
and Rorden, 2003; Mevorach et al., 2006; Buschman and Miller,
2007; Arcizet et al., 2011; Leathers and Olson, 2012). Indeed, the
anterior portion of the supramarginal gyrus identified in the cur-
rent study has been anatomically established as clearly distinct
from more posterior parietal regions (Mars et al., 2011), and has
been functionally implicated in the representation of action out-
comeswith paradigms that largely rule out attentional confounds
(Hamilton and Grafton, 2006, 2008).
A few previous neuroimaging studies have used economic
decision tasks to separate information theoretic from motiva-
tional variables (Luhmann et al., 2008; Abler et al., 2009; Smith et
al., 2009; Symmonds et al., 2011). The current experiment differs
from such studies in several critical respects: First, in our study,
outcome probabilities were acquired through trial-by-trial expo-
sure to action–outcome contingencies, rather than being verbally
or graphically instructed–substantial behavioral evidence suggests
that decisions based on descriptive information can differ quite dra-
matically from those based on direct experience (Hertwig, 2012).
Second, we used instrumental contingencies, whereas in gambling
studies decisions are stimulus based, with stimuli being randomly
assigned to particular actions on each trial. Finally, unlike previous
studies addressing the entropy, risk, or probability associated with a
single decision, we assessed neural encoding of the divergence of
outcome distributions associated with simultaneously available ac-
tion alternatives.
Our approach yields unique insights: to our knowledge, the
activity currently observed in the IPL is quite different from pa-
rietal activity emerging in gambling paradigms, which has been
more posterior, and which has not been unambiguously attrib-
utable to probability magnitudes versus entropy or risk (Ernst et
al., 2004;Weber andHuettel, 2008; Smith et al., 2009; Symmonds
et al., 2011). Our effects in the more anterior portion of the IPL
may reflect the use of instrumental contingencies: Gla¨scher et al.
(2009) found that effects in this area were stronger for action-
based than for stimulus-based decisions. Another novel contri-
bution of the current study is the dissociation of goal and action
values. Both Abler et al. (2009) and Smith et al. (2009) found that
activity in the insula increasedwith rewardmagnitude, consistent
with our effects in this area of the utility of potential food out-
comes. However, whereas neither previous study reported any
areas of activation for action values beyond those observed for
rewardmagnitude, we found that VMPFC activity increasedwith
the value of the chosen action. This discrepancy betweenprevious
studies and ours may reflect selective encoding of experienced
over instructed information: Fitzgerald et al. (2010) found
greater VMPFC activation for experientially acquired than for
described value signals.
Other previous work has directly investigated neural corre-
lates of model-based versus model-free RL. However, these stud-
ies focus primarily on value signals (e.g., Daw et al., 2005),
without exploring the possibility that valence-neutral state tran-
sitions are represented independently of associated motivational
features. One notable exception is a study by Simon and Daw
(2011) in which the degree of model-based branching, essentially
the complexity of forward planning, was defined as the number
of choices available in the current state, as well as the expected
number of choices in subsequent states. They found positive neu-
ral correlates of these measures in the lateral precentral cortex,
the anterior insula, and the anterior cingulate/SMA, but not in
the IPL. There are, however, two critical differences between their
analyses and ours: First, they weremodeling the number of avail-
able actions, rather than contingent outcome states; this distinc-
tion is particularly important given previous findings that the
right anterior IPL distinguishes between outcome identities, but
not between action kinematics (Hamilton and Grafton, 2006,
2008). Second, Simon andDawmodeled the number of expected
future options summed across, rather than as a divergence across,
currently available options. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
results differed substantially from those obtained here.
Goal-directed performance is characterized by a sensitivity to
changes in the instrumental contingency that has been reliably
demonstrated in rodents as well as humans (Hammond, 1980;
Shanks andDickinson, 1991; Balleine andDickinson, 1998; Lilje-
holm et al., 2011). In a previous study, using a free-operant task,
in which the rate of executing a single rewarded action is self-
paced,we found that activity in the IPL correlatedwith changes in
instrumental contingency, formalized as the difference between
probabilities of reward in the presence versus absence of an action
(Liljeholm et al., 2011). Unlike outcome divergence, instrumen-
tal contingency conflates the probabilities and values of out-
comes. Moreover, instrumental contingency is signed, reflecting
the relative advantage of performing or not performing a partic-
ular action (indeed, in our previous study, activity in the left IPL
was found to correlate negatively with instrumental contingency,
perhaps reflecting the relative advantage of withholding a re-
sponse). Nonetheless, outcome divergence can be characterized
as a general, symmetric, extension of instrumental contingency
to the case ofmultiple actions and outcomes. As such, our current
demonstration of a role for the IPL in encoding divergence is
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consistent with our previous work implicating this area in the
probabilistic integration of action alternatives.
In conclusion, we show modulation of the IPL by the diver-
gence of outcome probability distributions associated with alter-
native actions, and dissociate this decision variable from both
stimulus utilities and action values. As applied here, JS divergence
reflects the extent to which discrimination between available ac-
tions has any impact on the occurrence, and predictability, of
future states. Conversely, this information theoretic measure
captures the attributability of a current environment to distinct
antecedent actions. As such, it is likely to play a central role in
goal-directed encoding of action–outcome contingencies, a sug-
gestion that is supported by the current findings.
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